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ARTICLES
Ex Parte Interrogation: Invasive Self-Help
Discovery
Donald J. Farage*
In wars between nations, it is notoriously customary for each
side to use every possible device to defeat the other. True, some in-
ternational agreements entered into during peacetime proscribe cer-
tain practices, such as the use of various gases and chemicals, and
other practices that are considered "beyond the pale" even by war-
ring but civilized nations. Even these restrictions, however, are
honored sometimes more in the breach than in the observance. The
gentlemanly rules of the Marquis of Queensberry have little place in
war. Among other strategies, each side seeks information and help
from insiders of the opponent, especially by obtaining information
about the strengths, weaknesses, plans, and resources of the adver-
sary. These informers are called traitors by those whose confidences
are divulged, but, euphemistically, they are called honorable inform-
ers, dissidents, or defectors by those to whom the information is
given. In some instances, these purveyors of information turn out to
be double agents who, for a price, provide desired information for
both sides.
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American College of Trial Lawyers, International Society of Barristers.
This paper was delivered as part of a symposium held on April 29, 1989, at the Dickinson
School of Law.
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In litigation, under the common law, it is assumed that contests
should be conducted under the equivalent of the Marquis of Queen-
sberry's rules, with fair play for both sides. In determining what is
and is not permissible, the difficult question is where to draw the
line. We are in an age of increasing concern and alarm about the
lack of ethics and courtesy among members of the legal profession.'
Given a line of demarcation between the ethical and unethical, be-
tween proper and improper practice, unfortunately there are those
who are prepared to test the rules and, in the name of advocacy, to
come very close to the prescribed line.
This paper discusses one aspect of the ongoing efforts of aggres-
sive advocates to strain the legal equivalent of the Queensberry
Rules almost to the breaking point. The question is as follows:
While defending a medical malpractice case, may an insurance car-
rier utilize a lawyer to engage in ex parte3 contact with the plaintiff's
treating doctor without notice to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attor-
ney in order to persuade the doctor to divulge his knowledge about
the patient and to testify against the plaintiff at the trial?4
This precise problem was presented in Moses v. McWilliams.5
1. Resort to ex parte techniques is apparently a relatively recent manifestation of hard-
ball tactics, characterized by "[a] mindset that litigation is war . . . [a] conviction that it is
invariably in the [lawyer's] interest to make life miserable for [one's] opponent," and "[a]
disdain for common courtesy and civility." Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics
Don't Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 79. The American Bar Association and lawyers gener-
ally are bemoaning the loss of professionalism among lawyers. A poll conducted by the ABA
reports that 68% of those polled confirm that professionalism has decreased. About 55% of
state and federal judges agree. Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of
Governors and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243, 254
(1986). The mere fact that such a commission exists speaks for itself. See also Hengster,
News, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1989, at 36.
2. While this paper cites many cases and authorities, the citations are not exhaustive.
For further discussion of the issue, see the collection of authorities by Thomas J. Foley, Jr.,
Esquire, and Terrence R. Nealon, Esquire, in a paper presented as part of the 17th Annual
Dickinson Forum, Oct. 28, 1988, at 69-91, and the amicus brief prepared by Terrence R.
Nealon, Esquire and submitted to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Moses v.
McWilliams. Copies of the paper and brief are available upon request from the Dickinson Law
Review office.
3. Ex parte is defined as a "[p]roceeding only from one of the parties; hence likely to be
prejudiced. An ex parte statement is a one-sided or partial statement made by one side without
modification from the other." E.C. BREWER, DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 387 (I.M.
Evans rev. centenary ed. 1970). The term ex parte has also been defined as follows:
On one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the applica-
tion of, one party only. A judicial proceeding, order, injunction, etc., is said to be
ex parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one
party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely
interested.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979).
4. In the context of this question, the earlier allusion to traitors, dissidents, defectors,
and double agents seems justified.
5. 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950 (1988), appeal denied, 558 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1989).
Ex PARTE INTERROGATION
In Moses, the plaintiff sued Albert Einstein Medical Center
(AEMC) alleging that the negligence of one of its interns resulted in
her undergoing an otherwise unnecessary hysterectomy and other
medical treatment.6 Doctor Marvin Krane performed the hysterec-
tomy, thereby becoming the plaintiff's treating physician.7 AEMC
was defended by its malpractice insurance carrier, Underwriters,
which hired attorney McWilliams to represent the defendant.8 The
insurance company contacted Dr. Krane and set up an appointment
for him to meet with attorney McWilliams.9 McWilliams met sev-
eral times with Dr. Krane, each meeting occurring ex parte, without
notice to the plaintiff or her attorney.10 The plaintiff claimed that it
was not until McWilliams gave the statutorily required notice of the
list of testifying expert witnesses that the plaintiff learned that not
only had her treating doctor discussed the case with McWilliams,
but that the doctor was also allied with McWilliams against her."
Although the notice to the plaintiff listed Dr. Krane as an in-
tended expert witness, the trial judge limited the doctor's testimony
to factual matters, and did not permit him to testify as an expert.'
Neither the trial court nor the Superior Court of Pennsylvania indi-
cated the substance of the doctor's testimony, but the line between
fact and opinion is, at times, shadowy. The distinction is so vague
that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended
to allow certain discovery of both fact and opinion. 3 As trial lawyers
well know, the recital of "facts" by a witness for the defendant nor-
mally sounds quite different from the recital of the same "facts" by
a witness for the plaintiff. Semantics, innuendo, and body language
all combine to create varying impressions in the minds of the
hearers.
The outcome of the plaintiff's malpractice case against AEMC
was not indicated, but with her treating doctor testifying against her,
it is likely that the plaintiff lost the case. The plaintiff then sued Dr.
6. Id. at 154, 549 A.2d at 952. For purposes of ruling on defendant's motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, the court accepted all plaintiff's well-pleaded averments of fact as true.
Id. at 154 n.2, 549 A.2d at 952, n.2. For purposes of this Article, the alleged facts will also be
accepted as true.
7. Id., 549 A.2d at 952.
8. Id., 549 A.2d at 952.
9. Id. at 154-55, 549 A.2d at 952.
10. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 154-55, 549 A.2d 950, 952 (1988), ap-
peal denied, 558 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1989).
11. Id. at 155, 549 A.2d at 952.
12. Id. at 155 & n.3, 549 A.2d at 952 & n.3.
13. See 10 GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D, PROCEDURAL RULES SERVICE, § 4003.1:24, at 97-99
(1979); see also PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.1, 4003.5.
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Krane for his alleged breach of confidentiality, and joined attorney
McWilliams and Underwriters for allegedly inducing Dr. Krane to
commit the breach." The lower court granted judgment on the
pleadings for all defendants.' 5 On appeal, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed by a six to three vote, with Chief Judge Ci-
rillo filing a strong dissent.'
The majority opinion treated this case as one of first impression.
However, in doing so, the court overlooked Alexander v. Knight,'7 in
which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a lower court
opinion, 18 which indicated that physicians owe a duty of confidential-
ity to their patients.' 9 Although the relevant language in Alexander
is dicta, it does provide guidance on the issue of physician-patient
confidentiality:
We are of the opinion that members of a profession, especially
the medical profession, stand in a confidential or fiduciary ca-
pacity to their patients. They owe their patients more than just
medical care for which payment is asked; there is a duty of total
care; that includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in
litigation, to render reports when necessary, and to attend court
when needed. That further includes a duty to refuse affirmative
assistance to the patient's antagonist in litigation. The doctor, of
course, owes a duty to his conscience to speak the truth; he need,
however, speak only at the proper time . . . Inducing the
breach of a confidential relationship between a doctor and pa-
tient is to be and is condemned."0
The majority in Moses also failed to cite Manion v. N.P. W. Medical
Center of N.E. Pa., Inc.'2 1 a case dealing with the issue of ex parte
interrogation. In Manion, Chief Judge Nealon of the Middle District
of Pennsylvania wrote a scholarly opinion that carefully reviewed
prior authorities and concluded that ex parte interrogation is
impermissible.2"
14. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 155, 549 A.2d 950, 952-53 (1988), ap-
peal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
15. Id. at 156-57, 549 A.2d at 953.
16. Id. at 171, 549 A.2d at 961 (Cirillo, J., concurring and dissenting).
17. 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962).
18. 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 649 (1961), affid, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962).
19. Id. at 655.
20. Alexander v. Knight, 25 D. & C.2d 649, 655 (1961), aff'd, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177
A.2d 142 (1962).
21. 676 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
22. Id. at 595 (predicting that if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would at least require reasonable notice to a plaintiff or his counsel before defense counsel may
communicate with plaintiff's treating physician).
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The Moses court conceded that the majority of states that have
considered the issue of physician-patient confidentiality have recog-
nized a cause of action for its breach.2 8 The court chose to give this
fact little weight, however. Furthermore, while the majority dis-
cussed many cases having only a peripheral relationship to the
Moses problem, it completely ignored relevant cases such as Alexan-
der and Manion.
The Moses majority stated that "within the narrow factual con-
text of this case," the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action
against any of the defendants.2 4 The court failed, however, to articu-
late just what the "narrow factual context of the case" was. The
dissent also appeared to be uncertain about the significance of these
words.25 Nevertheless, the majority held that, by starting suit against
AEMC, the plaintiff impliedly waived her claimed right of confiden-
tiality and implicitly consented, not only to disclosure by her physi-
cian in court or via discovery procedures, but also to disclosures ob-
tained ex parte by the defendant without notice to her or to her
lawyer.26 The majority gave little weight to the Hippocratic Oath
2
7
as well as the rules and comments of the American Medical Associa-
tion 2  because of some loose language therein, and suggested possible
exceptions to the generally required confidentiality. 9
The majority contended that even if the doctor violated the ca-
nons of medical ethics, such violation does not create a legal cause of
action." The court stated: "If Dr. Krane has behaved unethically,
23. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 156 n.4, 549 A.2d 950, 953 n.4 (1988),
appeal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989). The dissent noted that only Tennessee has heretofore
denied such a claim. Id. at 173, 549 A.2d at 962 (Cirillo, J., concurring and dissenting).
24. Id. at 156-57 & n.4, 549 A.2d at 953 & n.4.
25. Id. at 173, 549 A.2d at 961 (Cirillo, J., concurring and dissenting).
26. Id. at 156-59, 161-70, 549 A.2d at 953-54, 956-60.
27. The portion of the oath quoted by the majority is as follows: "Whatever in connec-
tion with my professional practice, or not in connection with it, I may see or hear in the lives
of men which ought not to be spoken abroad I will not divulge. ... I ld. at 161, 549 A.2d at
956.
28. The majority quoted from Principle IV of the Medical Ethics of the American Med-
ical Association (1980): "A physician shall respect the right of patients, of colleagues, and of
other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the
law." Id. at 161-62, 549 A.2d at 956.
29. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 162, 549 A.2d 950, 956 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1989). The majority quoted from Section 5.07 of the Current Opin-
ions of the Judicial Counsel of the AMA: "A physician should respect the patient's expecta-
tions of confidentiality concerning medical records that involve the patient's care and treat-
ment." Id. at 162, 549 A.2d at 956.
30. Id. at 162, 549 A.2d at 956. The court held that ethical violations did not give rise
to a cause of action under the facts of the case, and that:
Finally, Pennsylvania's medical licensing statute, 63 P.S. § 422.41, does not pro-
vide appellant with a basis for a cause of action. The statute proscribes "unpro-
fessional conduct." The only sanctions that can be imposed upon a physician for
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the medical profession can discipline him . . . . '[it is] a matter to
be addressed by the profession itself.' 31 The court's decision to
leave disciplinary action to the medical profession provides little
comfort to the plaintiff who is left without a remedy.
In denying a cause of action for breach of confidentiality, the
majority also relied upon the principle of witness immunity.32 The
court noted that such immunity is normally applied in defamation
cases,' but has been extended to other torts when they occur in con-
nection with judicial proceedings."3 Stressing the "need to expose
fabricated claims," the majority stated: "Such an extension of im-
munity evinces the strong policy behind the privilege: to leave rea-
sonably unobstructed the paths which lead to the ascertainment of
truth."34 In their time, the rack and thumbscrews were regarded as
having much the same virtue.
The majority in Moses also reasoned that "malpractice claims
should be investigated at the earliest possible stage to determine
their validity."3 5 The court failed to show, however, why normal dis-
covery procedures could not have started as promptly and been just
as effective and expeditious as ex parte interrogation. Indeed, the
majority emphasized that relevant information of this kind will inevi-
unprofessional conduct are refusal, revocation or suspension by the board of the
doctor's license. There is no provision for an independent cause of action against
the doctor for money damages, nor is there any indication that the General As-
sembly intended to create one.
Id., 549 A.2d at 956 (footnote omitted).
None of the opinions in Moses made reference to the Interprofessional Code, which was
approved by the Philadelphia County Medical Society, the Philadelphia County Osteopathic
Society, and the Philadelphia Bar Association on November 1, 1973 (Copy on file at Dickinson
Law Review office). The Code has never been repudiated, and provides, in part:
11. Medical Reports
A) The physician should render a report within a reasonable time after re-
ceiving a request for it. In no instance should the physician render a report to or
confer with any party or his representative without due authorization.
Since the doctor and the insurance company's attorney in the Moses case were both from
Philadelphia, if they were members of one of the subscribing associations, it is surprising that
the Interprofessional Code was ignored not only by both doctor and lawyer, but by the entire
panel of judges in the Moses case.
31. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 157 n.7, 549 A.2d 950, 954 n.7 (1988)
(quoting Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1984)). A question arises: Would the court
react the same to lawyers who violate the rules of ethics?
32. Id. at 163, 549 A.2d at 956-57. The court noted the rule that "communications
pertinent to any stage of judicial proceedings are accorded an absolute privilege." Id., 549
A.2d at 957 (quoting Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa. Super. 422, 436, 536 A.2d 1337, 1344
(1988)).
33. Id. at 164, 549 A.2d at 957 (citing cases in which witness immunity was extended to
torts such as civil conspiracy, interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress).
34. Id. at 164, 549 A.2d at 957.
35. Id. at 160, 549 A.2d at 955.
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tably be revealed.8 6 In addition, the majority contended that ex parte
interviews are less costly than discovery, and are conducive to candor
and spontaneity.3 7 That spontaneity, however, may lead the doctor
into areas into which he should not be going.
Finally, and as a coup de grace, the majority sustained the con-
tention of attorney McWilliams that his conversations with the doc-
tor were subject to the work product privilege and were totally im-
mune from discovery by the plaintiff since they were "covered by the
absolute privilege accorded relevant statements made in the course
of litigation."36 This the majority did cavalierly, without discussion
or citation. One wonders what happened to the majority's initial ob-
jective of "leav[ing] . . . unobstructed the paths which lead to...
truth." 9
Taken as a whole, the majority opinion should serve as a model
for propaganda literature of insurance companies and tort reform
advocates. The court gave virtually no weight to the social and moral
desirability of preserving the confidential relationship between doctor
and patient. Apparently, the work product of a lawyer is more sa-
cred than the confidentiality between physician and patient.'
Of course, a principal reason for requiring adherence to formal
discovery rules is the inability of the court and the plaintiff's counsel
to control what information is disclosed ex parte. The majority did
note that such ex parte disclosures "should be limited to that which
is pertinent and material,"" and that "by issuing protective orders a
court can place restrictions on the scope of medical discovery with-
out actually prohibiting ex parte interviews."' 2 But how can plain-
tiff's attorney get a protective order before he knows that an ex parte
meeting is even contemplated, or, indeed, has been held? Obtaining
a protective order after the ex parte interview is over is hardly pro-
tective. It is locking the barn after the horse has been stolen.
Plaintiffs should be allowed to protect the doctor-patient privi-
lege before it is compromised. There is no adequate way to police an
order, assuming that plaintiffs attorney was able to obtain a protec-
36. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 168, 549 A.2d 950, 959 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989) (citing Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C.
1983)).
37. Id. at 167, 549 A.2d at 959.
38. Id. at 170, 549 A.2d at 960.
39. Id. at 164, 549 A.2d at 957.
40. For additional discussion of the work product rule, see infra notes 71-77 and accom-
panying text.
41. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 169, 549 A.2d 950, 959 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
42. Id., 549 A.2d at 959.
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tive order prior to the ex parte meeting. Plaintiff and his counsel are
helpless if they are not present. Even a conscientious doctor may not
know when to stop his disclosures because he neither realizes the
scope of the legal issues in the suit, nor has sufficient knowledge to
determine what is legally relevant. The only remaining protection is
the defense lawyer's own conscience. One must suppose that he will
have the same rigid impartiality as that of a fox guarding the
henh6use. Moreover, because of the Moses court's work product rul-
ing, plaintiffs are foreclosed from determining if the doctor has made
any improper disclosures, making it almost impossible to secure
meaningful protection against the doctor's adverse testimony at trial.
Of course, courts that allow ex parte contact refuse to presume
that defense counsel has any sinister or overly aggressive motives.
Other courts have recognized that such faith denotes naivete43 since
actual cases have established overreaching."'
The doctor in Moses probably had his own malpractice insur-
ance coverage. When the defendant's insurance carrier contacted Dr.
Krane for an interview, perhaps there were veiled suggestions that
the doctor's own coverage would not continue or be available unless
he cooperated. This conclusion would be applicable and appropriate
if the doctor happened to have his coverage with the same carrier as
did the defendant. However, the work product ruling of the court
prevented the plaintiff from discovering the relationship, if any, be-
tween the doctor and the carrier. Apart from possible intentional
misconduct by defense counsel, even a conscientious attorney may
fail to recognize that there is no one present in an ex parte interview
to protect the plaintiff's interests by raising objections.
According to the majority in Moses, despite the physician-pa-
tient relationship, if a doctor testifies only as to facts, he is in the
same position as a lay witness. The majority acknowledged, however,
that if the doctor gives information that has no relation to the under-
lying facts or to the lawsuit, there may be a cause of action against
him.45 "[Tihe physician . . . is still on his own in determining
43. See, e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 148 Il1. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952
(1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
44. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty, 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (patient
permitted to maintain action against insurance company for inducing his physician to divulge
confidential information gained through physician-patient relationship; the insurance com-
pany's attorney lied to the doctor by telling him that the patient was also planning to sue him);
Miles v. Farrell, 549 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Il. 1982) (in medical malpractice action, physician
who treated plaintiff was not permitted to discuss plaintiff's medical condition with opposing
counsel except as permitted by authorized discovery rules).
45. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 169, 549 A.2d 950, 960 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
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whether the scope of the questions . . . is so extensive as to require
him to expose himself to liability . . . and a decision to grant an
interview is not without risk, and must be strictly voluntary.""'
Respectfully, it is shortsighted to regard a physician, even if he
is testifying solely as to facts, as equal to a nonparty witness to an
automobile accident. Lay witnesses, unlike physicians, do not nor-
mally receive confidential information and do not stand in any fiduci-
ary or trust relationship on which a party to the case may justifiably
rely. Thus, the majority's restriction of ex parte meetings to fact wit-
nesses essentially provides no protection for the plaintiff.
With respect to the usefulness or necessity of ex parte inter-
views for obtaining legitimate evidence, the following judicial obser-
vation is significant:
A thorough review of case law from other jurisdictions
reveals that in not one instance has a court found that ex parte
conferences were necessary in order to permit defense counsel to
obtain information that they were unable to obtain through reg-
ular channels of discovery. Thus, it is undisputed that ex parte
conferences yield no greater evidence, nor do they provide any
additional information, than that which was already obtainable
through the regular methods of discovery.
7
The basic issue underlying the propriety of ex parte interviews
is whether there is social and moral value in preserving a confidential
relationship between doctor and patient. Many of the arguments that
emphasize the need for ex parte interviews to discover evidence of
fraudulent claims early in litigation, to arrive at the truth, and to do
so at less cost than formal discovery, are makeshift arguments to
justify what must strike even insurance companies and tort law re-
formers as an anomaly.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Moses acknowl-
edged that historically a cloak of confidentiality has been placed
upon communications between a patient and his doctor.' Both ac-
knowledged the existence of general restrictions upon the physician,
46. Id., 549 A.2d at 960 (quoting Missouri ex rel. Stuffelbaum v. Appelquist, 649
S.W.2d 882, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
47. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App, 3d 581, 587, 499 N.E.2d 952, 956
(1986) (emphasis in original). See also Karsten v. McCray, 157 Il. App. 3d 1, 14, 509 N.E.2d
1376, 1384 (1987) (ex parte conversations failed to provide any information that could not
have been received through formal discovery methods). See also Wenninger v. Muesing, 307
Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 N.J. Super. 392, 476 A.2d 1279
(1984); Kime v. Niemann, 64 Wash. 2d 344, 116 P.2d 1074 (1976).
48. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 168, 549 A.2d 950, 959 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
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which are based upon the Hippocratic Oath49 and the American
Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics,5" as well as an
AMA Judicial Council opinion stating that: "[P]hysician[s] should
not reveal confidential communications or information without the
express consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law." ' 1
The majority in Moses, however, assiduously sought and found all
sorts of limitations on the Hippocratic Oath, the AMA's Principles
of Medical Ethics, and the AMA Judicial Council opinion. 52 Having
decided to reach a conclusion in favor of permitting disclosure, the
majority relied on perceived exceptions. 53 The dissent obviously re-
jected the suggestion of exceptions and focused instead upon the his-
tory of the physician-patient relationship.5" The dissent noted that
the issue of plaintiff's cause of action was one of first impression, but
that the public policy balances between disclosure in litigation and
the non-disclosure desired by patients favors the rights of the patient
litigant.5" The dissent also noted that historically patients have been
led to assume that their treating physicians would not break faith
with the expectation of confidentiality.56 Discussion of the existence
or nonexistence of confidentiality with regard to the particular cir-
cumstances of the case essentially describes the result that the ma-
jority or minority sought to reach, rather than the reason for the
result.
Perhaps Shakespeare, in Julius Caesar,57 was more eloquent
than lawyers or judges in posing the problem. There, we are told
that on the Ides of March Caesar is stabbed in the back by his erst-
while friend Brutus. As Caesar turns, fatally wounded, he exclaims
in hurt amazement, "Et tu, Brute!"58 Or, freely translated, "Why,
you dirty, two-faced son of a bitch!" Only by visualizing the situa-
tion can one appreciate the frustration and helpless fury of the vic-
tim when he realizes the unexpected betrayal by a supposed friend
and trusted confidante.
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association (1977).
51. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. at 175, 549 A.2d at 962 (Cirillo, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (quoting Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the AMA, § 5.05).
The majority opinion does not refer to this section.
52. Id. at 161-62, 549 A.2d at 956.
53. Id., 549 A.2d at 956.
54. Id. at 174-76, 549 A.2d at 962-63 (Cirillo, J., concurring and dissenting).
55. Id. at 173, 189, 549 A.2d at 962, 970.
56. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 174-75, 177, 549 A.2d 950, 962, 964
(1988), appeal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
57. W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, scene 1.
58. Id.
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I confess that I feel no less dismay and disgust for a lawyer who
asks a Dr. Brutus to break faith with his patient. 9 In asking the
doctor to throw his patient to the winds, the lawyer must persuade
the doctor that he is not technically guilty of violating his Hippo-
cratic Oath and that there is merit or advantage to the doctor or to
society in forsaking the patient and terminating all confidentiality.
The situation is reminiscent of the biblical story of Jesus going
to the top of the mountain, where Satan tried to tempt Him by offer-
ing all worldly riches if Jesus would become a follower of Satan.60
Of course, Jesus resisted temptation. But, when the lawyer went to a
Dr. Brutus in the Moses case, it is likely the lawyer used both argu-
ments and inducements in order to persuade the doctor. It would be
naive to believe otherwise. One can visualize a lawyer saying that
doctors must stick together against unscrupulous claimants; that, to-
day, Albert Einstein Medical Center is the defendant, but tomorrow,
it may be Brutus himself. Of course, Brutus must know that insur-
ance rates are going up and sometimes insurance is difficult to obtain
at any price. These are only a few of the arguments the attorney
might have presented. Who can blame Brutus for accepting these
reminders in the friendly spirit in which they are presented? Indeed,
the majority opinion in Moses supplies such arguments for insurance
lawyers by stressing the need to defeat nonmeritorious malpractice
claims.61
Before Moses, in the light of the dicta in Alexander v. Knight, 2
and the common law in nearly all other states,63 any Dr. Brutus was
59. As a youth, many years ago, I recall the presidential campaign of Al Smith, the first
Roman Catholic to run for office. He was subjected to slurs, particularly by southern Protes-
tant politicians, on religious and other grounds. Two of his most vocal detractors were named
Heflin and Hayes. I recall newspaper accounts of Smith being asked questions concerning the
charges made by these two opponents. His reply was: "1 know Heflin, and I know Hayes. They
are like two slices of beef cut off the same carcass, only Hayes is nearer the horns." I am
inclined to put a Dr. Brutus an inch or so closer to the horns than a lawyer who instigates the
breach of confidentiality.
60. Matthew 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13.
61. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 160, 549 A.2d 950, 955 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989). Almost everyone knows that the expense of experts, deposi-
tions, copies of voluminous hospital records, and the costs of preparation of any malpractice
case already serve to discourage nonmeritorious claims. Quaere: Whether the attorney utilized
such arguments to induce the cooperation of Dr. Brutus, or whether the attorney disclosed the
views of the plaintiffs' bar as to the cause of high insurance rates and insurance
nonavailability.
62. Alexander v. Knight, 25 D. & C.2d 649 (1961), af'd, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d
142 (1962).
63. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 156 n.4, 549 A.2d 953 n.4 (1988), ap-
peal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989); id. at 173, 549 A.2d at 962 (Cirillo, J., concurring and
dissenting) (the dissent noted that only Tennessee has denied a cause of action for a physi-
cian's breach of confidentiality).
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at risk of being sued by a patient for breach of confidentiality. Addi-
tionally, the majority in Moses conceded that under some circum-
stances a doctor may be exposing himself to a suit for damages by
the patient.6 One wonders, but not for long, whether the lawyer ap-
proaching Dr. Brutus suggested that the doctor should obtain inde-
pendent counsel for advice as to potential liability of the physician to
the patient. Obviously, the more the attorney dwells on potential
risk, the less likely the doctor will be to agree to breach confidential-
ity. At a minimum, the majority in Moses puts the lawyer in a con-
flict of interest with the doctor. How much can the lawyer tell the
doctor without running the risk that the doctor's cooperation will be
lost? Should the lawyer agree to defend the doctor, free of charge, if
suit is initiated by the patient against the doctor? Is any payment or
other consideration given by the lawyer to the doctor?65 Suppose
that the doctor is found liable to the patient for damages. Who
should pay the judgment, the doctor or the lawyer and his insurance
carrier?
Perhaps the answer to the conflict of interest dilemma is that
the doctor and the lawyer deserve each other. Is it not surprising
though, that while the Moses majority clearly creates a potential
conflict situation, none of the six majority judges ever adverted to
the existence of a conflict or the potential for extended litigation be-
tween the patient and the doctor or the doctor and the lawyer?
The Moses majority also erred in refusing the plaintiff's discov-
ery requests. The patient's attorney sought to discover what tran-
spired at the meetings between the insurance lawyer and the doc-
tor,66 presumably including what conversations took place, what
representations were made by the lawyer to the doctor, whether any
improper inducements were offered, and what concessions were given
the doctor. The majority summarily denied any right of discovery,
however, by invoking the work product rule.67
Throughout my career as a lawyer, almost without exception,
my expert witnesses have been questioned about the circumstances
surrounding their employment, their relationship to the parties and
to me, and the amount they would receive in payment. Since such
64. Id. at 169, 549 A.2d at 960.
65. Concerning payments, note that even in Alexander v. Knight, 25 D. & C.2d 649
(1961), affd, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962), the insurance company paid some
money to the doctor.
66. See Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 170, 549 A.2d 950, 960 (1988),
(Cirillo, J., concurring and dissenting), appeal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
67. Id. at 170, 549 A.2d at 960. See also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text;
infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
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questions go to the credibility of the witness, the inquiry is proper
and relevant. In view of the ex parte nature of the discussions be-
tween the attorney and the doctor, one would think that interrogato-
ries or other discovery tactics aimed at such communications are es-
pecially relevant to the credibility of the physician who subsequently
testifies at trial. The Moses court, however, cursorily denied all dis-
covery related to the ex parte contact, despite the possibility of fraud
and overreaching."
The majority in Moses jumped to legal conclusions on two im-
portant points. First, the court assumed that this case of "first im-
pression" presented a clean slate with no limits on the court's power
to decide the issue. Second, the court assumed that existing discov-
ery rules69 are neutral on whether confidentiality may be invaded ex
parte. Even a superficial review of the discovery rules, however, sug-
gests that they are not necessarily neutral. For example, Pennsylva-
nia Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.5(a)(3) provides:
A party may not discover facts known or opinions held by
an expert who has been retained or specially employed by an-
other party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial
and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, except
a medical expert as provided in Rule 4010(b) or except on order
of court as to any other expert upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject
by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such
provisions concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem
appropriate.7
0
Despite the requirements of Rule 4003.5(a)(3), can it reasonably be
contended that a party may ignore the prohibitions of the rule and
cavalierly resort to ex parte interrogation, doing through the back
door what he may not do through the front? Before condoning ex
parte interrogation, should not the majority have given the Rules at
least a fleeting glance to determine whether they were intended to
bar self-help?
Additionally, by invoking the work product rule, the Moses
court summarily refused to permit the patient to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the doctor's disclosure of confidential
68. Id., 549 A.2d at 960. See also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
69. See PA. R. Civ. P. 4001-4025.
70. PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.5(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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matters. 71 Should not the majority have considered possible limita-
tions on the scope of the work product rule? For example, in discuss-
ing work product Professor Charles W. Wolfram, the American Law
Institute's Reporter for the Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers, pointed out: "Certainly, it ought not to be open to an insurance
company to transmute any claims adjustment investigation into a le-
gal investigation just by having a lawyer do it."7  Moreover, Wolf-
ram noted that in the case of work product, "a great deal of it can
be discovered if the party seeking discovery can show need and hard-
ship."'7 3 Similarly, in the discussion of work product in Standard
Pennsylvania Practice 2d, it is stated that "the opinion of a lawyer
must be disclosed if evidence at trial establishes prima facie that the
attorney was used to promote an intended continuing criminal or
fraudulent activity.
74
As already indicated, ex parte interrogation is fraught with the
opportunity for fraud and overreaching through inducements,
money, or other consideration."
[I]n an action against a no-fault insurance carrier to recover at-
torney's fees for the alleged unreasonable denial of a no-fault
71. Moses v. McWiliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 170, 549 A.2d 950, 960 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
72. Thinking About the Privilege, An Interview with Professor Charles W. Wolfram, 18
THE BRIEF 20, 39 (1989) [hereinafter Wolfram Interview]. THE BRIEF is a periodical pub-
lished by the Tort and Insurance section of the American Bar Association. The Moses major-
ity failed to note that the defendant's attorney's discussion with the plaintiff's treating doctor
was really not "lawyering," but investigative work, much like a claims agent investigating a
claim for possible fraud. Other courts have clearly distinguished between "lawyering" and
investigating, and have refused to regard investigative work as privileged from disclosure, ei-
ther under attorney-client or under work product immunity. See, e.g., National Farmers'
Union Ins. Co. v. Tenneco, 718 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1986); cf. Panko v. Alessi, 362 Pa. Super.
384, 524 A.2d 930 (1987) (distinguishing a buyer-seller relationship from that of attorney-
client, and holding that attorney's involvement in a buyer-seller relationship does not give rise
to a confidential communication). See also Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lilly, 112 F.R.D. 160 (D.
Minn. 1986); Cook v. Watt, 597 F. Supp. 545 (D. Alaska 1983).
73. Wolfram Interview, supra note 72, at 40.
74. 6 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 34.27, at 387-88 (1982).
In Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933), Justice Cardozo explained that the attorney-
client privilege "takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for
advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He
must let the truth be told." See also VIII WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 577, § 2298 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). This rationale has been extended to the civil fraud area. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,
456 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972); Bergeson v. National Sur. Corp., 112 F.R.D. 692 (D. Mont.
1986); In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 570 (D. Colo. 1986); Kockums Indus., Ltd. v.
Salem Equip., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 168 (D. Or. 1983); Brown v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 327,
670 P.2d 725 (1983); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 436, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 871 (1983); Kahl v. Minnesota Wood Speciality, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1979);
Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979); Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 49
Wash. App. 375, 743 P.2d 832 (1987).
75. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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claim, a plaintiff is entitled to those portions of documents pre-
pared in connection with the investigation of the plaintiff's no-
fault claim which contain the insurance investigator's evaluation
of the evidence, as well as his opinion as to the merits of the
claim."
My point is that the majority in Moses should have considered the
scope of the work product rule before automatically invoking the
doctrine to bar an inquiry into the circumstances of the ex parte
interrogation. Certainly, not everything a lawyer does is a work
product entitled to be cloaked in secrecy." Respectfully, the major-
ity gave no consideration to the scope of the work product rule.
In order to allow ex parte discussions between the treating doc-
tor and the insurance attorney, the Moses majority justified its ex-
tension of pre-existing law by indicating the desirability of finding
the truth.7 8 However admirable that objective, the majority somehow
lost sight of the quest for truth when the insurance lawyer and the
doctor were asked to disclose what they must now regard as embar-
rassing circumstances. If the search for truth justifies a breach of
confidentiality, why does it not also justify a disclosure of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the breach as bearing on credibility and as
falling under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.3 because
of possible fraud or illegality? The majority not only allowed a
breach of confidentiality, but also permitted the doctor and lawyer to
draw a cloak of secrecy around themselves to hide possible embar-
rassment and even possibly criminal or fraudulent activity.79
In addition to the physician-patient context, the basic issues un-
derlying Moses arise in other relationships, including attorney-client,
priest-penitent, broker-client, realtor-client, and innumerable
others. 80 Understandably, the majority chose not to extend its hold-
76. 6 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 34.28, at 388-89 (1982).
77. Piro v. Bell, 25 Pa. D. & C.3d 668, 670 (1981).
78. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. at 150, 164, 549 A.2d 950, 957 (1988), ap-
peal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
79. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
80. See Katz, Ethics: The Right Choice, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 140 (illustrative of
the fact that ex parte interrogation raises common questions for all professions). Katz poses
the following ethics quiz for readers:
You have filed a complaint in a sex discrimination suit, alleging that plaintiff's
supervisor, A, has denied her a promotion because your client is a woman, and
the company has a policy against promoting women. Your client suggests that
you contact B, another manager for the same company, whom your client has
overheard criticizing the company's negative attitude toward women. Quaere,
you may contact B ex parte?
Nancy Katz, Assistant Ethics Counsel for the ABA Ethics Department, answers "No"
citing Model Rule 4.2, which prohibits communication by a lawyer for one side with persons
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ing beyond the "narrow factual context of this case, ' 81 but it did
refer to Pelagatti v. Cohen8" and to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 588, which deal with the confidentiality of statements
made in private conference with an attorney. The Moses dissent also
expressed concern about "what effect the majority's decision will
have on similar confidential relationships, for example, the attorney-
client relationship or the accountant-client relationship."' I3
The lawyer-client privilege was dealt with only peripherally by
the majority. It failed to allude to Pennsylvania statutes dealing with
attorney-client confidentiality protection in criminal and civil cases.
The relevant Pennsylvania statutes provide:
In a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or
permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him
by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the
same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial
by the client.84
In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permit-
ted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his
client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same,
unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the
client.85
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct
provide:
having a managerial (and, therefore, I assume, confidential) relationship with the other side. It
would appear that there is really no substantial difference between that situation and Moses.
Quaere: Should not confidentiality be protected in both cases? Would a court be justified in
distinguishing them, solely because one involves a company manager and the other a treating
doctor?.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 210, comment a (1942) states the rationale for the
attorney-client privilege as follows:
In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws as complex
and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert legal advice is essential. To the
furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of communication of
pertinent facts is a prerequisite. To induce clients to make such communications,
the privilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by courts and ccmmentators
to be a necessity. The social good derived from the proper performance of the
functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that
may come from the suppression of the evidence in specific cases.
Should the privilege of confidentiality be broader for communications to lawyers than for
those to doctors?
81. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. at 150, 156 n.4, 157, 549 A.2d 950, 953 &
n.4 (1988), appeal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
82. 370 Pa. Super. 422, 536 A.2d 1337 (1988).
83. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 195 n.4, 549 A.2d 950, 973 n.4 (1988)
(Cirillo, J., dissenting), appeal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
84. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5916 (Purdon 1982).
85. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5928 (Purdon 1982).
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Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to repre-
sentation of a client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs
(b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information if necessary to
comply with the duties stated in Rule 3.3.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent that
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a crimi-
nal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another;
(2) to prevent or to rectify the consequences of a
client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of
which the lawyer's services are being or had been used;
or
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the cli-
ent, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim or disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or
to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation of the client.
(d) The duty not to reveal information relating to represen-
tation of a client continues after the client-lawyer relationship
has terminated.86
In light of the majority's position that a doctor's violation of the
code of medical ethics creates a problem only for the medical profes-
sion to police, rather than a legal cause of action for the patient,
87 it
appears that a lawyer's violation of the disciplinary rules likewise
would be ignored in determining whether such a violation creates a
legal cause of action for the client.88
86. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 (1988). See Packel,
Confidentiality Under the Attorney-Client Privilege Statutes and the New Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 18 PRAC. BULL., PBA CIVIL LITIG. SEC. 1, 2 (Feb. 1989).
87. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 157 & n.7, 549 A.2d 950, 954 & n.7
(1988), appeal denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989). See also supra notes 30-31 and accompany-
ing text.
88. Suppose, for example, that P, while waiting in his stopped automobile for a red
traffic light to change, is rear-ended by another vehicle. He goes to attorney B with complaints
of very severe pain and permanent residual injury in the lumbar area. B succeeds in effecting a
prompt, satisfactory settlement with the carrier for the offending driver.
Three years later, P, claiming injury from a second rear-end accident involving another
driver, goes to attorney C, who brings action against the second driver. P and C concede P's
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Professor Packel of Villanova Law School noted that the stat-
utes governing attorneys' communications and the professional code
provisions are quite different.8 9 Packel suggested that the statutes
apply to offers to admit evidence in open court, whereas the profes-
sional rules apply in all situations. Some may have difficulty with the
proposed distinction, and it remains for the courts to reconcile
whatever conflicts may exist between the statutes and the profes-
sional rules. If the majority's position in Moses - that the physi-
cians' code of ethics is solely for the medical profession to enforce,
and not a basis for legally enforceable rights9" - prevails, by anal-
ogy the professional rules for lawyers should also be ignored by our
courts, and violations would become a problem only for the discipli-
nary board instead of creating a legal right of action for the client.
In any event, the dissenters in Moses were justifiably concerned
about the majority's failure to note the potential effects of the Moses
decision outside the medical profession. 91
Regardless of the profession or calling involved, the basic issues
prior accident involving the lumbar area, but assert that the first injury had substantially
cleared up, and that P was not having pain at the time of the second accident. P now claims
serious lumbar injuries, with exacerbation and/or aggravation of the previous injury.
D, the attorney for the second driver's insurance carrier, goes ex parte to B and, after
gently chiding him about P's going to another lawyer for his second accident, persuades B to
cooperate with him and to testify against P concerning P's allegations of severe injury and pain
which P had made to B after the first accident, in support of D's contentions that only the first
accident caused serious injury, and that P's testimony as to exacerbation or aggravation is not
credible.
B and D both justify their action on the basis that, by suing the second driver, P waived
his right to confidentiality under Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950,
and that there is a "strong policy ... to leave reasonably unobstructed the paths which lead
to the ascertainment of truth," id. at 164, 549 A.2d at 957, and that D's ex parte interrogation
of B was "conducive to candor and spontaneity," and was a "cost-efficient method" of dispos-
ing of meritless (in the judgment of B and D) medical claims "at the earliest possible stage,"
all as suggested by the majority in Moses. Id. at 167, 549 A.2d at 959, 958-59.
In Moses, the majority denies that lifting the cloak of confidentiality makes it "more
likely that the patients will cease communicating with their doctors when seeking treatment"
for subsequent illnesses. Id. at 168, 549 A.2d at 959. Notwithstanding the alleged social inter-
ests by which B and D seek to justify their ex parte dealings, I suspect that any member of the,
Moses majority finding himself in a posture similar to P's might be inclined to question the
propriety of the behavior of B and D. Not only might such majority member conclude never
again to entrust any matter to B, but he might be hard put to repress a bitter, "Et tu, Brute!"
89. Packel, supra note 86, at 2.
90. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
91. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. at 156 n.4, 549 A.2d at 973 n.4. Moses will
certainly give rise to disputes about confidentiality in fields 6utside of medicine. Since Moses
provides no framework of analysis, but rather addresses only its specific facts, these issues are
likely to plague the courts for some time. For example, in the field of religion, it is notorious
under canon law that "[i]t is absolutely wrong for a confessor in any way to betray the peni-
tent for any reason whatsoever, whether by word or in any other fashion." Carey, Clergy in
Court, CASE & COMMENT, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 27. Of course, religious sects may proclaim
differences from canon law in the area governing confidential relationships.
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arising from confidential relationships should be approached uni-
formly. The underlying question is to what extent confidential com-
munications based on a trust or fiduciary relationship should be pro-
tected from ex parte discovery. In a recent interview, Professor
Charles W. Wolfram, referring to the matter of treating confidenti-
ality of all professions uniformly, stated: "We can make the argu-
ments distinguishing all other professions from the law, but I think
only we lawyers can persuade each other that those arguments are
terribly persuasive. '"" Speaking specifically to a lawyer's duty of
confidentiality, Wolfram stated:
The privilege says that a lawyer can't be forced to give testi-
mony about the contents of the lawyer-client communications.
There's another doctrine that says that, even if the lawyer isn't
forced, . . . a lawyer can't publish it in books, can't give
speeches about it, can't tell other people in private conversation
if it's confidential client communication.9"
Wolfram's language also makes sense if the word doctor is substi-
tuted for lawyer. In deciding Moses, should not the court have con-
sidered the potential Pandora's box it opened in the form of confi-
dentiality problems in other professions?
While the plaintiff in Moses was seeking review by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court94 a three-judge panel of the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court decided Culp v. Williams. 5 Affirming a Delaware
County decision by a two-to-one margin, the Culp majority upheld
the lower court's refusal to exclude factual and expert testimony of
the plaintiff's treating doctor after the doctor engaged in ex parte
discussions with defense counsel. 96 The plaintiff in Culp had no no-
tice of the doctor's defection until two weeks before plaintiff's trial
92. Wolfram Interview, supra note 72, at 40.
93. Id.
94. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied plaintiff's petition for allowance of appeal.
Moses v. McWilliams, __ Pa. -, 558 A.2d 532 (1989).
95. - Pa. Super. - , 560 A.2d 831 (1989) (table). The Culp decision will not be
published. The three-judge panel consisted of Judges Olszewski, Johnson, and Del Sole. Judge
Olszewski wrote a memorandum containing the opinion of the court. Judge Johnson filed a
concurring memorandum, and Judge Del Sole filed a dissenting memorandum.
96. Culp v. Williams, No. 3119 Philadelphia 1987 (Pa. Super. Mar. 6, 1989), slip op. at
1. Also allowing ex parte interrogation, see Holtzzman v. Zimmerman, 47 Pa. D. & C.3d 608
(1988), in which Judge Bayley refused to follow Manion and denied plaintiff an order prohib-
iting the treating doctors from engaging in further ex parte discussions with the defense or
from calling the treating doctors as defense experts at trial. See also Fitzwater v. Gouldin, 17
Lyc. Rep. 268 (1988).
For recent decisions forbidding ex parte interviews, see Bohrer v. Merrill-Dow Pharma-
ceutical, 132 F.R.D. 217 (D.N.D. 1987); Jordan v. Sinai Hosp., 171 Mich. App. 328, 429
N.W.2d 891 (1988), and cases cited therein.
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deposition of the doctor. 97 Rejecting Manion v. NPW Medical
Center,8 the majority in Culp, through Judge Olszewski, a dissenter
in Moses, held that "based on Moses . . . the ex parte communica-
tions and testimony were permissible." 99 Interestingly, Judge Del
Sole, who was in the majority in Moses, dissented in Culp, stressing
that the Moses decision limited interrogation and testimony to the
facts of Moses, whereas Culp was extending Moses to permit ex
parte interrogation about both facts and matters of expertise.100 Sur-
prisingly, however, Judge Del Sole went beyond limiting the use of
ex parte evidence to facts, and made comments one would expect
only from the dissenters in Moses. For example, he stated:
It is important to remember that this duty of confidentiality is
an evidentiary privilege which, like the attorney-client privilege,
belongs not to the professional but to the person receiving the
services. Commonwealth ex rel. Romanowicz v. Romanowicz,
213 Pa. Super. 382, 248 A.2d 238 (1968). Because this privilege
belongs to the patient, it is up to the patient to invoke it or to
ignore it. This choice does not belong to the physician.''
Judge Del Sole's language in Culp suggests that even ex parte
factual testimony is inappropriate. Thus, the respective positions of
the majority and the dissenters in Moses are more confused than
ever. Judge Olszewski, a dissenter in Moses, suggested that Moses
controlled the Culp decision."0 2 Judge Del Sole regarded Moses as
distinguishable from Culp.'03 The third judge, Judge Johnson, con-
ceded that: "[I]t is not clear to me that Moses v. McWilliams is
controlling."' 104 More than ever, clarification by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court is needed.
It is noteworthy that the majority in Moses sought to mollify
the consequences of ex parte interrogation by asserting that the trial
court had power to limit the scope of the doctor's testimony. 05 The
97. Culp v. Williams, No. 3119 Philadelphia 1987 (Pa. Super. Mar. 6, 1989), slip op. at
2.
98. 767 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Pa. 1987). See also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying
text.
99. Culp v. Williams, No. 3119 Philadelphia 1987 (Pa. Super. Mar. 6, 1989), slip op. at
7.
100. Culp v. Williams, No. 3119 Philadelphia 1987 (Pa. Super. Mar. 6, 1989), Dissent-
ing Memorandum of Del Sole, J., at 5-6.
101. Id., Dissenting Memorandum of Del Sole, J., at 6.
102. Id., slip op. at 7.
103. Id., Dissenting Memorandum of Del Sole, J., passim.
104, Id., Concurring Memorandum of Johnson, J., at 3.
105. Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 169, 549 A.2d 950, 959 (1988), appeal
denied, 558 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1989).
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only illustration given by the Moses majority was the court's power
to restrict testimony to factual matters. 1' Since Culp eliminated
even that restriction, one wonders whether there is anything that a
lower court can do to protect against excesses in ex parte
interrogation.
II. Conclusion
The majority opinion in Moses is unsatisfactory particularly be-
cause of the deficiencies previously discussed. The apparent confu-
sion among the members of the Pennsylvania Superior Court about
the meaning of Moses and the problems that the case creates com-
bine to justify Pennsylvania Supreme Court review of Culp, and one
hopes, reversal of Moses.
If Moses is not reversed in a subsequent case, one result is inevi-
table: Plaintiffs' lawyers will seek to use Moses to their advantage,
since Moses certainly would not be applied solely in favor of defend-
ants. Assuredly, plaintiffs' attorneys will become adept at approach-
ing defendants' medical witnesses ex parte; defense lawyers have no
monopoly on ingenuity and creative techniques for invasive ex parte
investigation. One wonders how the defense lawyers in Moses and
Culp will react, if and when they suddenly find their defenses under-
mined by ex parte interviews of their star witnesses, of which inter-
views they are unaware until the last possible moment before trial.
As Shakespeare put it, "If you wrong us, shall we not revenge? ...
The villany you teach me I will execute; and it shall go hard, but I
will better the instruction.' 0 7
Inevitably, if open season is declared for ex parte interrogation,
courts will be asked to scrutinize the circumstances surrounding such
interrogation. Litigation will become longer, nastier, and more
costly, and will necessitate increased court supervision. Courts
should not allow and subsequently supervise such dirty business, but
rather should return to the philosophy of Alexander v. Knight.'
The symbolic figure of justice, standing tall, firm, and blind-
folded, carries a sword in her right hand, and a balance scale in her
left. Blindfolded, she cannot be swayed by the sight of a prince's
crown or a pauper's rags. Her weapon is the sword of chivalrous
combat, not the dagger so often associated in fact and fiction with a
106. Id., 549 A.2d at 959-60.
107. W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act 111, scene 1.
108. 197 Pa. Super. 79, 117 A.2d 142 (1962). See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying
text.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
stab in the back. Surely no honorable advocate would seek to shift
that delicate balance in his favor by pressing a surreptitious thumb
to his side of the scales. The last thumb in the world to press those
scales should be that of a court, the personification of justice, by
putting its imprimatur on surreptitious ex parte procedures that by-
pass, and indeed, flout established rules of discovery and ethical con-
duct. It is suggested that the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Moses
granted such an imprimatur.
Apart from the legalities, lawyers should look askance at ex
parte interrogation. As recently noted by former Watergate prosecu-
tor Archibald Cox, "[P]ublic pressure to reform the legal profession
is rising . . . from within . . . ."9 "[F]ewer lawyers are following
the example of Elihu Root who would tell clients: 'Yes, the law lets
you do that, but don't do it. It is a rotten thing to do.' "1" In short,
legal or not, ex parte interrogation is among those procedures that
simply are not "cricket."
Ultimately, under the majority view of Moses, no confidential
communication is immune from ex parte invasion. Whom can one
trust to keep a confidence? According to Moses, the simple answer is
no one. Nor, apparently, can we trust our courts to safeguard confi-
dential communications with doctors, lawyers, priests, and other con-
fidantes, though all states but Tennessee have recognized the sanc-
tity of such privileged communications.' For courts to countenance
ex parte interrogation of any professional in a confidential relation-
ship is to encourage the moral apathy decried by the ABA and all
lawyers who have been calling for a revival of the spirit of true pro-
fessionalism and common decency.
Many centuries ago, the biblical Moses led his people out of
servitude in the land of Egypt, in search of the Promised Land. It is
hoped that the Moses decision will prompt the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in the interests of decency and justice, to protect a
patient's right of confidentiality and bar ex parte interrogation of
treating physicians.
Epilogue
Since dictation of this paper, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has denied a petition to review the action of the Superior Court in
109. A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 36.
110. Id.
11. See supra notes 23, 63 and accompanying text.
Ex PARTE INTERROGATION
Moses.1" What a tragedy! An application for Supreme Court review
is pending in Culp. One fervently hopes, in light of the confusion
existing among the members of the Culp panel as to the import of
Moses, and in view of the fact that Culp approves ex parte interro-
gation for the purpose of getting expert opinion as well as fact from
the treating doctor, that review of the problem denied in Moses will
be granted in Culp.
112. See supra note 5.

